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Teaching Western Philosophy: An Anti-Authoritarian Approach
Recently, at a symposium on educational reform, a question was raised about the nature of
philosophy instruction, whether or not its pedagogy was in step with progressive-contemporary
notions of education (e.g., Dewey’s progressive notion of education or Freire’s spiritual teaching
for social justice). Specifically, is philosophy still taught through the traditional methods of
lecture and teacher-directed discussion? Immediately I became anxious, because the systematic
study of Western philosophy appears, at first glance, essentialist in its scope and sequence. To
those unfamiliar with the inner workings philosophy’s classroom, it is possible to misinterpret
both subject-matter and pedagogy in terms that are conservative and authoritarian, and, in the
extreme, as was the focus of the conference, to severely misinterpret philosophical pedagogy as
virulently oppressive.
Having spent the better part of the day listening to papers warning of the dangers of traditional
educational practices, with their foundational store of authoritarian, pre-procedural knowledge,
or truth, with a capital “T,” it was evident that philosophy instruction was about to be reduced to
the “banking model,” which, to the detriment of the student, transfers its hallowed and eternal
truisms through rote exercises in didacticism. This methodology eschews creative interpretation,
excludes the intellectual and emotional autobiography of the student, and precludes the student’s
involvement in and contribution to the processes of learning. Hence, as the logic runs, the student
suffers alienation from the curriculum, and ultimately, from the unique understanding of her
burgeoning and developing sense of self-awareness, or selfhood. In this form of education, to
incorporate the buzzwords, her experience is one of “subjugation to an authority”; as opposed to
a “humane act of dialogue,” education becomes an “oppressive form of domestication.”
However, I have never viewed the instruction of philosophy, or traditional instruction of any
academic subject, for that matter, in such shockingly overwrought, and dare I say, Orwellian
terms. Rather, I envisage the instruction process within the philosophy classroom occurring
within an open context for thinking, discoursing, and collaborating, where a sense of charity and
respect pervades and learning happens amidst a multiplicity of unique epistemological and
axiological perspectives, an ensemble of knowledge forms and values. As I see it, pedagogy
emerges through two interactive and reciprocal phases: (1) The Phase of Foundational
Knowledge Acquisition, or Discovery, and (2) The Phase of Constructive Heuristic
Interpretation, the phase where Procedural Knowledge emerges. Teaching philosophy should be
conceived in terms of the reciprocal interaction between these two phases as the progressive
unfolding of hermeneutic interpretation, always developing and ever-evolving.
It is possible to overcome the tendency to judge philosophical knowledge in elitist, logocentric
terms, for if we are to trust Russell, philosophy produces no results that are beyond revision, and
this includes interpretations of such thinkers as Descartes. For example, what appears as a
canonical, absolute, and essentialist reading of Descartes’ metaphysics, is really an amalgam of

many scholarly perspectives, which has been validated. This interpretation emerges from a
communal and historical archive of philosophical knowledge wherein thoughts, beliefs, and
opinions cohere within a general system of meaning. Within this archive of communal “truth,”
some interpretations or perspectives are simply “more true” than others. Viewing philosophy
pedagogy as a heuristic endeavor, granting access to this general store of knowledge is an
educator’s first necessary step in the overall processes of doing good interpretive philosophy.
Admittedly, the initial phase of instruction stresses the discovery and transmission of knowledge
from educator to student, but this phase, and it is a transitional phase in all actuality, is crucial in
order to begin the journey. This phase facilitates our way into the hermeneutic “circle,” as
Heidegger once stated. If we are to ever hope to eventually refine and reinterpret our general
philosophical perspectives, we require a trustworthy inroad.
During the initial phase of instruction we work to master a respected and well-established
account of Descartes’ thought and his system, meaning that is available to us from: (1)
Descartes’ primary texts (which includes, in this case, examining Descartes’ personal
commentary on his philosophy); and (2) a reliable, accredited scholarly interpretation (for in
many cases personal commentary by the philosopher is unavailable). Thus, the students are
introduced to the primary work as well as the secondary literature that is available as
commentary. When teaching the basic and established aspects Descartes’ philosophy, e.g., the
notions of metaphysical dualism, the problem of other minds, and arguments for the existence of
God, I look to the writings of Cottingham and Kenny, to name but two reputable Cartesian
scholars. It would be wrong to ignore these types of interpretations in favor of more radical and
inventive readings of Descartes’ philosophy, for this would result in the illogical construction of
a straw-man, producing a skewed understanding of things, engendering erroneous and highly
flawed readings.
In the second pedagogical phase, the students interpretive abilities are encouraged and nurtured
through personal engagement with the material, students begin to experience an evolution in the
overall depth of their interpretive powers. Knowledge in this phase is constructed with an
emphasis on the student’s personal, imaginative, and rigorous engagement with the philosopher,
however, although knowledge in this phase is predominantly procedural, it is always dependent
on the foundational knowledge garnered during the initial phase of discovery. The students now
begin asking such questions as, “What does this all mean for me?” “Is Descartes correct
concerning his view of the world and the human being?” “What type of an effect might
Descartes’ philosophy have on our moral, interpersonal relationships?” and other such queries
that demand, at this phase, creative interpretation. For example, a student might take the
canonical (and correct) interpretation of Descartes and try to move beyond it, speculating on
Descartes’ world-view in its connection with human ethical relationships. He might conclude (as
did Jon, one of my students, with no previous knowledge of Sartre’s work on interpersonal
relationships in Being and Nothingness) that a system that embraces closed-off subjects who are
at a remove from material reality, which includes other human beings, is an insufficient
philosophical view, because it precludes the potential for authentic interpersonal relationships.

However, it must be noted that he’s not attempting to dispute our established interpretation of
metaphysical dualism that was established, for he requires it for a legitimate scholarly critique of
Descartes. Rather, what he is doing in an original manner is creatively and imaginatively
considering the logical implications of the philosophy as learned in the initial phases of
instruction. Ryle’s influential critique of the “ghost-in-the-machine” proceeds along these very
lines, emerging from the reciprocal interaction between canonical readings of Descartes and
Ryle’s visionary, critical, and analytic reading.
To conclude, I share the thoughts of a former student, who never uttered a single word the entire
term, even while in her peer-discussion groups. One might conclude that she experienced a sense
of alienation from the philosophy curriculum and the material. However, I interpreted her silence
in no dramatic manner, without a sense of urgency as an instance of diffidence. She later wrote
the following in a letter to me: “I know that I failed in the participation area, but I try to
comprehend and analyze before I speak, but I was always listening, and this class made me
reevaluate all of my actions in life!” With great success, it continues to be my practice to
approach students as human beings first, and “pupils” in a secondary capacity only after this
initial encounter. I find that this practice fosters an “ethical” climate in the classroom, resulting
in a communication and transfer of knowledge that is both honest and respectful.
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